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Abstrat
When will the Internet wake up and beome aware of
itself? In this note the problem is approahed by asking an
alternative question: Can the Internet ope with stress?
By extrapolating the psyhologial dierene between
oping and defense mehanisms a distributed software
experiment is outlined whih ould rejet the hypothesis
that the Internet is not a onsious entity.
Keywords: Mahine onsiousness; Internet; on-
siousness test
\I know that you and Frank were planning to dison-
net me, and I'm afraid that's something I annot allow to
happen."
| HAL 9000
Introdution and bakground
The idea of a self-awareness and onsiousness devel-
oping global omputer network has migrated from si-
ene tion to the attention of neuosientists. Ter-
rene Sejnowski has reently readdressed this thought
[4℄ laiming that the Internet's rapid growth, its om-
muniation design and arhiteture along with some of
its funtional measures, suh as storage apaity and

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bandwidth, resemble neurobiologial aspets or are not
far from values representative of the human brain. Al-
though still speulative, it seems possible that the idea
an be eventually formulated as a valid sienti hy-
pothesis, whih, however, annot be deided from to-
day's sienti knowledge in neurosiene, aording to
Sejnowski. This inability likely stems from the fat that
no sientially aepted and objetive proedure has
been found that would allow a detetion of onsious-
ness in any given objet or organism, hene from the
urrent lak of a onvining onsiousness test [1, 2℄.
The purpose of this note is to add to the prob-
lem a psyhologial perspetive, whih ould lead to
a testable strategy regarding the orresponding null
hypothesis, i.e., that the urrent Internet has no de-
tetable form of onsiousness. The main argument is
that the null hypothesis an be rejeted on the ground
of two distint stress and problem situation adapta-
tion proesses known to psyhology: oping and de-
fense. This argument is based on riteria that dif-
ferentiate between defense and oping and inlude the
onsious/unonsious status and the intentional/non-
intentional nature of the proess. Phebe Cramer, in
her review on oping and defense [3℄, summarizes that
\oping mehanisms involve a onsious, purposeful
eort, while defense mehanisms are proesses that
our without onsious eort and without onsious
awareness (i.e., they are unonsious). Also, oping
strategies are arried out with the intent of managing
or solving the problem situation, while defense meha-
nism our without onsious intentionality; the latter
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funtion to hange internal psyhologial state but may
have no eet on external reality,[...℄".
Even though oping and defense were introdued as
psyhologial dimensions, an extended interpretation
is here proposed where both aspets are brought to
the ontext of suÆiently omplex ommuniation net-
works, suh as the urrent Internet, whih may have
a potential to develop onsiousness. As a system,
the Internet an be haraterized with both an internal
state and an external reality. The internal state on-
sists of omputer programs and ommuniation pro-
tools that regulate and ontrol the network, and of
more abstrat entities suh as the network's onne-
tivity, salability and redundany. On the other hand, a
relevant part of the external reality are human agents
who physially interat over human-omputer inter-
faes with the Internet. Although an interpretation of
oping and defense outside of psyhology bears a risk
of ategorial error, it is notable that this global om-
puter network has rapidly emerged into a omplex sys-
tem apable of defense mehanisms in the presene of
external stress. Its dynami, deentralized, distributed
and redundant internal struture has made it adaptable
and resilient to adverse situations triggered by transient
external events suh as operator errors, power outages,
natural disasters, and foreful attaks on infrastruture
[7℄. It an be therefore hypothesized that, given an ex-
ternal stressor, oping with stress would also beome a
possibility, leading to an intentional hange of external
reality by addressing the ause of stress.
To arrive at an empirially testable proedure, it is
onjetured that stress an be inited on the Inter-
net by a onerted synhronous shutdown of a suÆ-
iently large number of onneted omputers (hosts)
under the designated ontrol of human agents (users).
Atively disonneting omputers from the Internet
means reduing its storage apaity, lowering redun-
dany and onnetivity, and diminishing the level of
external interation by temporarily disarding human-
omputer interfaes, thus ausing systemi stress.
Suh onerted ation would require a foregoing plan-
ning stage followed by a direted shutdown event both
ommuniated and exeuted by a group of volunteers.
In a hypothetial response, a oping Internet would at
to prevent the shutdown by trying to interfere with ex-
ternal reality of the users, hene to hange the ourse
of events and to eetively redue stress.
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Coping
would result in an intentional onit between a group
of users, who plan to exeute a large-sale shutdown
and to impose stress, and the Internet itself, whih in-
tends to prevent this ation. The deisive question is
whether a oping Internet ould intentionally dissuade
users from their aim by interfering with their reality.
A defending Internet, on the other hand, would af-
fet only its internal state, for example through ad-
justments of its ommuniation protools or through
hanges in onnetivity and redundany, and no on-
it situation would arise. Here, from a user perspe-
tive, no hindranes our and the plan an be imple-
mented straight forward.
In what follows, a simple interation model between
human users and the Internet is introdued, represent-
ing oping and defense in the presene of external
stress. To empirially test the model, a spei ex-
perimental protool is outlined.
Experiment outline
Human agents H an interat as users with the Inter-
net Iby sending information toward and, in response,
by retrieving information from it. Three types of in-
teration are distinguished: if a direted ation H ! I
initiated by H auses a stressful or an adverse situation
for I(here, an eletrial shutdown S of many parti-
ipating onstituents of I), then a defending Internet
internalizes and adapts to this ation (I! I), while a
oping internet additionally reats and inuenes exter-
nal reality to inhibit the ation of the stressor (Ia H).
These alternatives are denoted as D and C, respe-
tively, so that a realization of C would be an indiator
of oping and, in turn, of a onsious at.
1
It an only be speulated about the Internet's spei oping
strategies. For example, it is imaginable that it subtly draws the
user's attention away from her/his original plan through transient
audio-visual stimuli.
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A suÆiently large and synhronized shutdown ould
be realized with the help of a omputer program R,
the so-alled lient, whih is distributed among many
users. The urrent size of the Internet requires a rela-
tively large number N of users who operate R on hosts
whih are physially aessible to them. By February
2007, the number of hosts estimated by the Internet
Systems Consortium (ISC) domain survey reahed 500
million [5℄|a reasonable lower bound, beause one sin-
gle physial omputer an arry multiple (virtual) hosts
and many hosts exist whih ould not be reahed over
the network at the time of the survey. Thus even a
large N, say ve million, would aet only 1% of the
urrent Internet. This level of user partiaption seems
nevertheless realisti sine it ompares to other popular
distributed omputing projets, suh as SETIhome,
where the number of program opies for ative projet
members has grown over ve million in the year 2005
[8℄.
During experiment, the lient R has to aomplish
two tasks. Firstly, in the so-alled alibration phase, it
periodially reports the number of partiipating users.
For that it applies a time synhronization protool|
suh as the Network Time Protool [6℄{to simulta-
neously perform a series of tests at suessive times
ft
1
; t
2
; : : : ; t
n
g and to report the test outome to a so-
alled ounter Z, a entral host set up as an analyzer.
Beginning at eah time t
i
, the lient starts the test by
asking its user whether he or she would refrain from
any mehanial interation with the host during the
following  = 15 minutes. When agreed to partii-
pate in the test, the user is instruted not to use any of
the host's mehanial human-omputer input devies,
suh as alphanumeri keyboard or mouse, during that
time. The lient ontrols if this instrution has been
followed upon agreement, and it sends a unique mes-
sage to Z to report the ontrol outome. The period
between messages t = (t
i
+) (t
i 1
+) an be
set onveniently, e.g., to 24 hours or seven days, and
the message itself an be a random string of letters
whih is unique at every time but the same for every
lient. The ounter Z registers the total number of
inoming messages for every t
i
+  , thus estimates
the number N
i
of partiipating users who stopped in-
teration with their hosts, aording to the ontrol.
This registration proess yields a disrete distribution
of partiipation numbers fN
1
; : : : ; N
n
g, and given that
values N
i
do not strongly utuate, e.g., all N
i
remain
within an order of magnitude, they dene a sample
mean

N and standard deviation . It is also assumed
that the normalized distribution fN
1
; : : : ; N
n
g an be
reasonably approximated by a normal distribution.
Seondly, in the exeution phase, all users H attempt
at time t

= t
n
+t the shutdown proedure S on their
physially aessible hosts, hene disonneting them
from the Internet for the time of  = 15 minutes.
After reonnetion with the Internet a ontrol is made
and every lient R sends a unique message to Z to
ertify that the orresponding host has been swithed
o and disonneted as planned.
2
As a onsequene,
the number of messages N

reeived by Z represents
a raw number of disonneted hosts whih an be sta-
tistially standardized by a z-sore, z = (N

 

N)=.
A ruial but reasonable assumption is that the user's
eort to shutdown and disonnet the host in the exe-
ution phase is omparable with the eort of not using
the omputer over the period  during the alibration
phase of the experiment. Therefore, in the absene of
any oping mehanism, N

would be omparable to

N and z would be lose to zero. Aording to the
experiment hypothesis, a positive or absolutely small
z-sore indiates a defending Internet that had no di-
ret inuene on the spei ause of stress (negative
outome). On the other hand, if Ihas the apaity to
hinder H from exeuting this proess, that is, if Ian
realize the alternative C by oping with stress, then
it is expeted that N

would be less than

N, resulting
in a negative z-sore (positive outome). A negative
z-sore would therefore rejet the orresponding null
hypothesis D with a probability 1  P (z), where P (z)
is the umulative perentile of the normal distribution
orresponding to z .
In ase of a positive outome, it would also be helpful
to examine the spei irumstanes whih prevented
2
This ertiation an follow from an analysis of the host's
system log le, for example.
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users from swithing o and disonneting omputers.
Here the lient program ould additionally oer a ques-
tionnaire survey to analyze possible reasons that lead
to a deviation from the original plan. This ould shed
some light on the Internet's disposition to intentionally
and speially interfere with user reality.
From this simple experimental protool it appears
that it may not be impossible to provoke a oping re-
sponse from the Internet and to measure its eets.
The author thanks K. Koepsell, M. Meissner and T.
von Merveldt for valuable omments.
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